We can prove when.
We cannot know what.
The notary anchors a fingerprint of a thing you keep (a manuscript, an invention, a photograph, a contract draft) into one public, hash-chained record. The thing itself never leaves your Vault. Showing it, later or never, is your move alone.
How it works
- When you seal a relic, your device computes sha-256(your bytes + a fresh random salt). The salt stays sealed in your Vault. We receive 64 hexadecimal characters and nothing else.
- The digest joins the chain: each entry is hashed over the one before it, so history cannot be rewritten without breaking every link after the edit, and the chain is re-verified every time a proof is served.
- To prove possession, you reveal the document and the salt to whoever you choose. They recompute the digest and find it anchored, at its date. Until you do, the anchor reveals nothing: not the content, not the owner, not that it is yours.
Check a fingerprint
Every anchor has a fingerprint: the 64 characters on its receipt, and the same 64 that any copy of the file produces. Paste one and the chain answers when it was anchored. It never answers what it is, or whose.
Anchoring happens from your own Vault on your page: tick Anchor a proof when you seal. The chain is global and anonymous on purpose: ownership is proven by revealing, never by the record. Publication of the chain head to places outside our control is the follow-up, listed rather than promised.
We can prove when.
We cannot know what.
or read How Liir Works · it is free on your own hardware
Sources
- Haber & Stornetta, How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document, Journal of Cryptology, 1991. The founding construction (a hash chain in which each entry commits to everything before it) is thirty-five years old. We implemented it; we did not invent it.
- IETF, RFC 3161, Time-Stamp Protocol. The standardized ancestor of what this page does, built on the same idea: a timestamp binds a digest, never a document.
- NIST, FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard. SHA-256, the digest the chain is made of: the reason revealing the document later proves it and holding the chain proves nothing.
Publication of the chain head to places outside our control is listed above as a follow-up rather than promised. Until it ships, "we can prove when" leans on our copy of the chain, and this note is where we say so.
Keep reading: Why this exists · Can it be hacked? · What it does to scams